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PRAGMATISTS, JOlNERS ANO BELONGERS: 
OEMOCRATIZATION ANO THE CULTURE OF MASS POLITICS IN SPAIN 
Spain has been the big success story of dernocratization. Its performance in 
overcoming such challenges as economic restructuring and regional 
separatism has led to a reversal oí its reputation íor political volatility. The 
new regime has be en vaunted as an inspiration if not a blueprint íor 
countries in Latin Arnerica as well as for the fledging experiments in Eastero 
Europe and íor the Soviet Union, and it has aroused considerable curiosity in 
the newly democratizing nations of East Asia (McOonough, 1989; Shin, 1989). 
Whatever its exportability, dernocracy in Spain has been in place long 
enough-going on two decades now-to provide an empirical basis for taking 
stock of what we know and what we don't know about the ingredients oí 
dernocratization in a key area of Europe. Our focus is on the role of political 
culture in dernocratization-on the evolving characteristics of lines of 
conflict, both longstanding and shorter-terrn, vis-a-vis institutional and 
structural changes. 
The manner of presentation is unorthodox. We move frorn an analysis 
of what we know with sorne certainty to an exploration oí patterns of 
dernocratization for which theoretical models have yet to be worked out in 
detail. During the last decade-and-a-half we have carried out tour national 
surveys in Spain, and our interests have evolved.1 As questions regarding 
some facets of dernocratization have come to c1osure, fresh ones have opened 
up. 
One set oí concerns has involved the dornains or levels of 
democratization and the possible linkages between thern. Our early surveys 
examined attitudes toward the political and the econornic aspects of 
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democratization-toward the legitimac:' of the new regime in balance with 
the old one, and toward questions of econornic opportunity and íairness. A 
key feature of the Spanish transition, one in which it resembles the course of 
change in Portugal, in Taiwan, in South Korea, and to a lesser extent in 
Brazil, but that sets it apart from events in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, is that political transíormation has not involved economic 
revolution. Antecedent reíorrns in economic policy, together with ongoing 
prosperity, helped smooth the transition and blunted appeals for radical social 
change. Liberalization has paid off. 
Our investigation into the growth of politicallegitimacy and popular 
perceptions oí economic performance has yielded an array oí íindings about 
the connections between depolarization and prosperity that are summarized 
in the íollowing pages. This line oí inquiry has also prompted us to probe into 
a sphere that lacks a handy labellike 'political' or 'socioeconomic.' It 
concerns the democratization oí everyday life, oí micro-structures oí 
authority long thought to be prívate or personal rather than political in the 
conventional sense. In one respect this departure is novel, emerging in our 
recent surveys and reflecting a curiosity about the day-to-day infrastructures 
oí politics with a small 'p: those that are embedded in vernacular 
hierarchies like the íamily (Walzer, 1988). In another sense, however, the 
íocus harks back to the early days oí studies oí political culture, with their 
notions oí the íunctionality oí congruence between micro-social patterns oí 
authority and macro-political íorrns oí organization (Eckstein, 1980). If a label 
is needed íor the questioning oí these habits, protocols, and putative linkages, 
it can be called 'cultural democratization.' 
Another set oí concerns centers around a dual íeature oí mass politics 
in Spain that constitutes a paradox in the light oí democratic theory. Perhaps 
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the great drama, the story at the center-stage oí Spanish democratization, is 
how undrarnatic the process has become. Old íerocities have given way to 
moderation. Depolarization-a virtual end oí ideology-has set in. 
Paralleling tlús development, however, has been a shortfall in organizational 
participation in civil society. The paucity oí associationallife runs counter to 
standard prescriptions íor a healthy democracy. Puzz1ement over the 
apparent tepidity and spottiness oí intermediate institutions converges with 
our interest in the attachment oí Spaniards to íorrns oí sociability and 
hierarchy represented by traditional, primary groups like the íamily and 
neighborhood networks. 
DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
Democratization can be depicted in bare-bones fashion as a two-dimensional 
change comprising politicalliberalization and movement toward social 
equity. Political opening-seen at a mínimum as the overthrow oí what 
Americans used to call 'tyranny'-and the reduction of economic disparities 
tend to be presented as mutual1y reinforcing rather than as a series oí stages 
(Muller, 1988) or, as was often the case in the nineteenth century, as c1ose-to-
incompatible (Bunce, 1990-91). 
Still, taken together, these changes harbor a certain arnbiguity. On the 
one hand liberalization signifies pluralism in the Schumpeterian vein. It 
entails the freeing-up of cómpetition between organizations--notably, 
electoral competition between parties-without reshaping hierarchical 
structures within organizations (Lipset, 1960). On the other hand, the 
formulation suggests the possibility oí extending democratic practices beyond 
the strictly polítical and perhaps even the socioeconomic realrns (Marshall, 
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1968) toward spheres of society that have traditionally been considered to be 
privateo 
Before getting into this progressive unfolding, however, it is worth 
noting two fUl'ther aspects of political democratization proper o One involves 
variations on territorial decentralizationo Despite micronationalist violence, 
devolution has prospered in Spaino The delicate alignment between central 
and subnationaltiers of govemment has theoretical as well as practical 
consequences, since democracies may adopt relatively centralized or relatively 
federal institutional forms (Lijphart, 1989)0 
Participation, especially the growth of membership in intermediate 
organizations, is another pivotal feature of political democratizationo Here, as 
;, we shall see, the shortfaIl of associationalism in Spain presents a puzzle for 
o" democratic theoryo The part ofour research disctissed here' attends more 
closely to issues involving participation than to the question to devolutiono 
, Both of these aspects of democratization-decentralization and 
participation-can be thought of as components of the enrichment of civil 
society (Hindess, 1991)0 Pressing this notion further brings us to a 
consideration of the extension of democratic norms and procedures to areas 
that are not usually p'ortrayed as political even though they touch the lives of 
many citizenso It raises the question of workplace democracy, íor example 
(Adamson, 1990)0 It also brings into question inherited forms of power 
relations in institutions of civic socialization like the familyo The unfolding 
implied by the democratization of everyday life goes beyond pluralism as 
customarily understoodo It raises the possibility oí transformations in both the 
economic hierarchies of industrialism and sorne of the vemacular 
institutions-the hierarchical farnily and male-female roles more generally-
inherited from preindustrial times (Keane, 1991)0 
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Some (Todd, 1985) argue that a rough match between the architecture 
of smaller social units and larger politieal institutions makes for eollective 
stability. However, evidenee of a eausallink between micro-democracy-for 
example, demoeratic family structures or eonsultative work arrangements-
and the soundness of democracy in the large is thin-to-nonexistent, and 
nothing in pluralist theory presupposes that structures of authority at 
different political and sociallevels need be uniformly democratie. 
Our approach takes changes in the politics of everyday life, embedded 
in such arrangements as the family, seriously. But our working assumption is 
that democratization at these intimate levels proceeds as a reflex oí or in 
tandem with broader flows of politieal and economic democratization. The 
possibility of feedback írom micro- to macro-Ievels, or of a tidy congruence 
between the two¡is for the moment left indeterminate' (Hareven, 1991). 
Another set of preliminaries, usually thought of as preconditions 
rather than constitutive elements of democracy, needs to be considered. 
Economic growth is regularly viewed as necessary or at least highly desirable 
for the tenability of democracy. Such development furnishes a utilitarian 
payoff for the risks of democratization, and it brings in its train a host of 
modemizing, presumably supportive transformations (Lipset and Turner, 
1987). 
Somewhat more nebulous are the cultural metamorphoses that 
prepare the ground for democracy. Of these one of the most crucial is 
ideological depolarization: a loosening of the ties that bind historical 
antagonisms. The supposition is that attenuation of this sort undercuts the 
penchant for either-or eonflict and promotes tolerance and bargaining (Dahl, 
1971). In Spain a c1assic example of one such cultural nexus has been the age-
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old overlapping of religiollS belief and conservatism, together with the 
, intertwining of secu1arism and anticlericalismo 
The 'dimensions' of democratization catalogued aboye can vary 
independently of one another. Cases of democratization in which all 
supposedly propitiou's conditions are rnaximized probably don't existo As a 
practical matter, the loosely connected, stochastic nature of democratization 
enables us to treat its components in modular fashion. It also encourages lIS 
to search for reinforcing linkages and flexible dissociations between the levels 
and domains of democratization, without pressing for nonrecursive cause-
effect paths. Our perspective here is panoramic. For the 'time being we are 
more interested in combinatorial pattems-some of which may be 
anomalollS from the standpoint of democratic theory-than in causation. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHA.'1GE 
Three rival diagnoses regarding the growth of political institutions 
under democracy can be discemed. One stresses the development of 
attachment to political parties as a vital sign of democratic representation 
(Converse, 1969). Parties are se en as indispensable vehicles for assuring the 
accountability of elites and the aggregation of interests. Strong, more or less 
reliable identification with parties undergirds democratic stability. Another, 
neocorporatist view contends that political parties have become increasingly 
marginal to the functioning of contemporary democracies and have tended to 
be displaced by proliferating interest groups that may or may not render 
democracies manageable (Berger, 1981; Maier, 1987). Still another perspective 
argues that both pluralist parties and corporatist agencies are succumbing to, 
or are at least being severely challenged by, the electronic media as structuring 
devices for electorates (Kellner, 1991). From this angle, the nuts-and-bolts 
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repertory of political organization is giving way to less palpable but quite 
powerful technologies of mass persuasion. 
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The first approach is straightforward in linking the growth of partisan 
attachments with the consolidation of democracy. The latter two perspectives 
are equivocal, though not uniformly pessimistic, about what the expansion of 
interest groups and the media signifies for democracy.2 
Our data perrnit a rough check of the first two of these ideas. Table 1 
gives the percentages over time of Spaniards reporting that they identify with 
a political party, that they belong to at least one voluntary organization, and 
that they are members of a labor union. The results are not encouraging for 
either the pluralist or the neocorporatist models of democratic development. 
Less than a majority of Spaniards identify with any political party. This 
percentage rose to 60 percent in 1984, two years after the 'PSOE (the socialist 
party) gained power. But by 1990 it had fallen back to 46 percent, the baseline 
figure for 1978. Sirnilarly, no more than a third of the citizenry reports 
membership in any voluntary association. Finally, the proportion of 
unionized Spaniards seems actually to have declined. 
While it is difficult to assemble comparable figures for other countries, 
levels of political involvement appear to be on the low side in a nation that 
ranks as high as Spain does on indicators of economic development (Instituto 
Sindical de Estudios, 1989). The prediction of democratic theory with regard to 
an evolutionary binding-in of partisanship turns out to be laggard at best 
(Barnes, McDonough and López Pina, 1989). And unless one is willing to 
construe corporatism as a steeply topdown system of economic orchestration 
in which most people are neither involved nor officially represented, the 
drop-off in the numbers for union membership dirninishes the credibility oí 
the neocorporatist label for Spain (Wilson, 1983). 
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TABLE1. 
ASSOCIATIONAL INVOL VEMENT IN SPAlN, 1978-90 
'. % identifying with 
polítical party 
% belonging to one or 
more voluntary 
assodations 
%union members 
1978 
46 
36 
12 
1980 1984 
46 60 
27 36 
8 5 
As íor organizational membership, while net growth has been 
1990 
46 
30 
5 
. negative, írom 36 to 30 percent oí the population, it remains moot whether 
'. this level is low by crossnational stand,ards. An informed,perhaps charitable 
guess would lead us to rank it as medium-Iow (McDonpugh, Bames, L6pez 
Pina, 1984). On balance, Spanish civil society seems not to have undergone a 
sustained burst oí associationalism during its democratic years. 
CULTlJRAL CHANGE 
Classifying cultural trends as democratic or nondemocratic is a chancy 
business. At íirst blush, regardless oí theoretical expectations, measurement oí 
cultural phenomena may seem even more slippery than the identification oí 
changes in associationallife. In addition, aside írom questions oí 
measurement, a shift to the ideological leít is not evidently more democratic 
than a shift to the right. Associational membership goes up or down, and 
íiguring out the meaning oí such change-if it can be detected in the first 
place-is not very troublesome. But interpretation oí the direction oí cultural 
shifts is problematic. 
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Two complementary ways oí approaching such problems present 
themselves. One is to suspend attempts at 'democratic' and 'nondemocratic' 
labeling and to concentrate on identif)ing trends in values, as opposed to 
presumably shallower opinions. Whatever their tie-in with democracy, 
cultural shifts like these turn out to be less el usive than estimates oí 
organizational activity. Left-right placement is a c1assic illustration oí a deep-
seated orientation for which reliable measurements are available. 
A second strategy adds theoretica1 weight t() the tallying oí separate 
trends. It involves monitoring changes in the relations between cultural 
indicators. For example, a slackening over time in the association between 
ideological (left-versus-right) and religious dispositions would suggest 
depolarization and, by implication, an increase in the tractability oí mass 
politics. Changes of this sort can be understood as less momentous than 
'paradigm-shifts' but more significant than mere fluctuations in preferences 
on specific issues considered one-by-one. They are parameter-shifts that 
represent alterations in the conventions by which people put grand 
antagonisrns together or compartmentalize them. They reflect changes in the 
coordinates oí the cognitive maps that citizens bring to politics, a reordering 
of 'c1eavages' (Lipset and Rokkan, 1968). 
Table 2 arrays the raw changes in a selection oí single indicators. It 
shows the percentage oí Spaniards who c1aim to be affiliated with a religious 
denomination. It also shows the mean position on an ideological scale 
running from left to right, and on similar scales assessing satisfaction with 
'the way democracy is working,' with the present government, as well as 
with the Franco regime.3 
'. 
;' 
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TABLE2. 
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL INDlCATORS, SPAIN, 1978-90 
1978 1980 1984 1990 
% affiliated with 
any religious 78 78 83 83 
denomination 
Mean position on left-
right continuum 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.4 
Mean satisfaction "with 
the way democracy 
is working" 4.5 4.2 5.5 5.6 
Mean satisfaction with 
government 4.5 4.2 5.4 5.5 
Mean satisfaction with 
"the last ten years of 
the Franco regime." 3.6 3.7 4.1 
On the average, no significant change is detectable in either religiosity 
or left-right placement. About eight out of ten Spaniards c1aim to be 
"believers," a percentage that if anything has edged up a bit from the 
benchmark year. Ideologically, Spaniards continue to tilt slightly to the center-
left.4 
By contrast, two other cultural indicators display impressive change. 
Satisfaction with the government has on the average gone up since the 
transition from the VeD (center-right) governments of the early days of 
redemocratization to the ascent of the center-left PSOE. Satisfaction with 
democracy-a measure that does in fact tap legitimacy for the regime as well 
as support for particular governments-c1osely parallels thís rise 
(McDonough, Bames and López Pina, 1986b).5 
Democratization & the Culture of Mass Politics in Spain -11-
These trends and non-trends seem favorable to the consolidation of 
democracy. The legitimacy of the re gime is established. The persistently high 
levels of religiosity imply an anti-democratic counter-trend only in light of 
simplistic theories about the salubrious connection between secularization 
and democracy (Wilson, 1982). 
Still, the results are far from seli-explanatory. Figure 3 unravels sorne 
of their implications from a slightly more complex perspective. Bere the 
correlations between cultural indicators are presented. 
T ABLE 3. EVOLUTION OF DIE ASSOOA TIONS BETWEEN 
REUGIOSITY, LEFI-RIGHT ORIENTATION, 
GOVERNMENT Sl."1'PORT ANO SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, 
1978-1990 
r (religiosity, left-right) 
r (left-right, satisfaction 
with democracy) 
r (religiosity, satisfaction 
with democracy) 
r (left-right, government 
support) 
r (religiosity, government 
support) 
1978 
.45 
.20 
.20 
.30 
.30 
1980 1984 
.51 .42 
.10 -.13 
.11 .00 
.24 -.29 
.20 -.03 
1990 
.29 
-.13 
.01 
-.24 
.03 
The data tell a story of gradual though not-quite-steady depolarization. 
The top-row correlations in the high .40s and low .50s reported for 1978 and 
1980 closely resemble the associations commonly reported between religiosity 
and left-right orientation in other Latin countries-Italy and France, for 
example-with a history of clerical-versus-secular confUcts. With the passing 
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oí the eighties these correlations, though still positive, show a marked 
.~ decline. 
This piece oí evidence, suggestive but unpersuasive on its own, picks 
up conceptual resonance in conjunction with adjacent pattems oí association 
and attenuation. As it happens, the switch from positive to negative in the 
correlations between left-right placement and govemment support, without 
much change in the absolute magnitude of the correlations, does not buttress 
the case for overall depolarization; lhis reversal is easily explained as 
reflecting the conjunctural change from a center-right to a center-Ieft 
govemment. Even here, however, the modest size of the coefficients, 
regardless of their sign, indicates a rather low degree of polarization between 
the parties as incarnations of ideological altematives to begin with. 
The shrinking of the association of religiosity with both govemment 
and regime support fumishes more convincing evidence of a cooling of 
cultural antagonisms. By 1984 there is simply no relationship between 
religious sentiment and either of these politícal orientations. Religious 
attaclunent appears to have little to do, one way or the other, with popular 
attitudes toward democracy or toward the govemment in Spain. 
A subtle but significant pattem in the differential connection of left-
right placement with govemment and regime support can also be detected. 
As previously noted, the nexus of left-right placement and satisfaction with 
the govemment is modest but consistent. The corresponding connection 
between left-right placement and satisfaction with democracy tumsout to be 
weaker, indicating a degree of separation between support for the 
govemment and support for the broader system. In Spain democracy is much 
less controversial ideologically, less a matter oí partisanship, than it used to 
be. 
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Constructs such as left-right placement and religiosity are supposed to 
be generic, with the advantage oí crossnational comparability. They can also 
be rather abstract, with a certain imprecision oí meaning. A complementary 
way to get at changes in the syrnboJic order of mass politics is to gauge the 
popularity of concrete figures who are invested with a cultural charge. The 
role of King Juan Carlos as a psychological anchor has been distinctive during 
the democratic transition. Shlfts in the degree to which prominent figures are 
associated with otherwise vaporous leftist and rightist tendances helps make 
changes in patterns of polarization visible. 
T ABLE 4. AVERAGE POPULARITY (1=LOW ••• 10=HIGH) 
OF POUTICAL FIGURES IN SPAIN, 
1978-90 
1978 1980 1984 
King Juan Carlos 6.4 6.5 8.0 
Adolfo Suárez 5.4 5.1 5.4 
Felipe González 5.6 5.5 6.5 
Manuel Fraga lribarne 3.3 2.9 3.7 
Santiago Carrillo 4.3 3.9 3.3 
Pope John Paul II 6.8 6.9 
Mikhail Gorbachev 
1990 
7.6 
4.4 
5.7 
6.2 
6.2 
The following three tabulations examine the resonance of the 
popularity of major personages within Spanish political culture. Let us begin 
with Table 4, which lays out the mean popularity for seven of these figures 
over time. 
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The personalities cover the spectrum from left to right. Besides the 
king, whose popularity is highest, we tracked thepopularity of Adolfo Suárez, 
leader of the now-defunct UCD during the transition and first president of the 
constitutional monarchy during this period, and of Felipe González, leader of 
the PSOE and president since 1982. The popularity of leaders farther to the left 
(Santiago Carrillo, former head of the communist party) and the right 
(Manuel Fraga Iribarne, former head of the rightwing Alianza Popular) was 
monitored during the first three surveys. We also elicited perceptions of John 
Paul U, who assumed the papacy in 1979, from 1980 on and, in the most recent 
survey, the popularity of Mikhail Gorbachev. 
The averages alone are of mainly documentary interest. Suárez has 
largely faded from the national picture; so have Fraga and Carrillo. 
González's popularity remains high though a bit diminished from the early 
years of his presidency. Next to the king. John Paul U appears to be the most 
popular figure in Spain. The times do not make for ideological coherence. 
The Pope is tied in popularity with the leader of the Soviet Union. 
Table 5 presents the correlations of the same figures with three broader 
estimates--with satisfaction with democracy, support for the government, 
and satisfaction with the former regime. Behind the phalanxes of coefficients 
are important lessons about the evolution of Spanish political culture. 
Sorne of the most significant patterns surround the figure of the king. 
Like Adolfo Suárez, he has been associated positively with the new re gime 
and, in appreciable but declining measure, with the Franco regime. The king 
has acted as a buffer during the historical changeover from authoritarianism 
to democracy. His presence, personality and behavior have served to reduce 
the potential for an either-or confrontation between the two systerns. 
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TABlE 5. CORRELATIONS BFTWEEN POlITICAL FIGURES 
AND 
(1) SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY 
(2) GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, & 
(3) SATISFACTION WITH FRANCO REGIME, 
1978-1990 
1978 1980 1984 1990 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) 
King .33 .42 .41 .36 .43 .37 .25 .25 .15 .28 .28 
Suárez .43 .33 .40 .41 .54 .43 .21 .16 .06 .11 .08 
González .23 .26 -.02 .32 .36 .00 .49 .67 -.19 .45 .65 
Fraga .17 .22 .48 .11 .18 .52 -.09 -.21 .52 
Carrillo .11 .04 -.21 .21 .16 -.25 .16 .21 -.02 
Pope .19 .32 .48 .. 02 -.01 .45 .11 .10 
Gorbachev .18 .10 
The king's centrist image stands out in contrast to the rightwing 
identification oí a figure like Fraga Iribame, who was never so closely 
associated in the popular mind with democratization or more precisely with 
the younger cohort oí democratizing elites to which the king belongs. The 
perceived links oí Fraga with the old regime remained very high, .52 in 1984. 
at a time when the same correlation for the king had dropped to .15. 
As íor Felipe González, it is his perceived neutrality or at most mildly 
negative association with the old re gime that stands out. Gonzalez is plainly 
identiíied with the sensible, instrumental center-Ieft. 
Table 6 extends the correlational analysis to the links between these 
figures and left-right placement and religiosity. The pattem oí depolarization 
comes clearly into view. 
;:: 
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TABLE 6. CORRELATIO::>lS BETWEEN POUTICAL FIGURES 
AND 
(1) Lm-RIGlITPLACEMENT& 
(2) REUGIOSITY, 
1978-1990 
1978 1980 1984 1990 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
King .43 .36 .39 .36 .12 .23 .06 .28 
Suárez .44 .35 .46 .38 .08 .10 .12 .08 
González -.14· .02 -.07 .00 -.33 -.04 -.25 .04 
Fraga .52 .34 .56 .35 .60 .30 
Carrillo -.36 -.17 -.37 -.26 -.39 -.31 
Pope .52 .56 .44 .56 .31 .54 
Gorbachev -.01 .01 
Over time the popularity of the king, which in absolute terms has 
stayed very high, has become les s bound up with ideologically conservative 
leanings. The drop is linear, from .43 in 1978, to .39 in 1980, to .12 in 1984, and 
to .06 in 1990. A major cause of this attenuation between the popularity of the 
kind and rightwing nostalgia and revanchism was the strong support 
. 
displayed by the king for the new regime during the attempted coup of 1981. 
The king came to be seen not only as a link to the past but as a defender of 
democracy. 
Of perhaps equal importance has been the consistent separation 
. between religious íeeling and the standing of Felipe González. He is 
obviously identified with the generic, versatile left. He has managed to stay 
c1ear oí the religious right as well as the schematic left. He has avoided 
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entanglements with a sixties-style leftism of liberation at the same time that 
he has sidestepped moral conservatism:The mantle of sober reformism, of 
secularism as impartiality, has helped Gonzalez enad pro-business legislation 
that a manifestly conservative party could not have pushed through with 
comparable facility.6 
In brief, symbolíc polítics has taken second place to economic 
pragmatismo This parting-of-the-ways of economic polícy and ideological 
rigidity is probably the most striking feature of the new regime. We explore 
this development in the next section. 
THE CULTURE OF POPULAR ECONONUCS 
Insofar as change in Spanish polítical culture has a bottom line, it is 
that a zero-sum perspective has given way to flexibility in the framing of 
polítical stakes. In part this maturation has taken hold as a reflex against the 
bloodletting of the Civil War; bitter experience convinced elites that the 
benefits of accommodation outweighed the costs of confrontation (Gunther, 
Sani, Shabad, 1986; Lannon and Preston, 1990). Prosperity has also contributed 
to political maneuverability. The structural development that took off in the 
early sixties has made the country one of the top dozen industrial powers in 
the world and a full member of the European economic comrnunity. Spain 
has been in a more favorable position than countries like Argentina and 
Brazil, not to mention the Soviet-bloc countries, in which economic 
deterioration has impeded efforts at democratization. 
As a generator of support for the new regime, economic growth has 
had three components. One is its sheer size and rapidity. Another is the 
impression of faimess associated with this growth-that is, the sense oí 
relative justice stemming from the interpersonal, keeping-up-with-the-
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Joneses comparisons that Spaniards make with respect to one another. 
t Another involves the intertemporal evaluations of present conditions in the 
light of recollections of or attributions about the Franco regime. 
Table 7 summarizes perceptions regarding all three components of 
economic growth. Spaniards were asked whether they feH economic 
conditions had improved, stayed about the same, or gotten worse for the 
. working class, the middle class and the upper class. An identical set of 
questions was posed in 1984 and 1990. Responses were first elicited for 'the 
years since 1982'-in other words, since the begilUÚng of the socialist 
government-and then 'in comparison with the last ten years of the Franco 
government. ' 
TABLE 7. PERCEPTIONS OF TIlE ECONOMIC SITUATION 
OF THE WORKL'<G CLASS, MIDOLE CLASS & UPPER CLASS 
SINCE 1982 ANO IN COMPARISON WITH THE FRANCO REGIME, 
1984 ANO 1990 
% improved since 1982 
working class 
middle class 
upper class 
% improved in comparison 
with the situation under 
Franco 
working class 
middle class 
upper class 
1984 1990 
18 65 
13 56 
32 72 
1984 1990 
47 73 
34 65 
33 73 
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The first-round results were promising but not spectacular for the 
PSOE government. In 1984, few Spaniards felt that the situation of any class 
had improved much under the sociallsts when the comparison was limited 
to the immediate pasto But in contrast to the way they were under Franco, 
many more felt that economic conditions had improved, especially for the 
working class. Altering the frame of reference to establish a contrast between 
the two regimes worked in favor of the democratic leadership and showed 
that, despite considerable grumbling, the new system had a reservoir of 
legitimacy.7 Even on these terrns, however, favorable responses were in the 
minority. 
By 1990, after eight years of PSOE rule, the political climate had changed 
dramatically. Confining the terrns of comparison to the years since 1982 no 
longer produces a sense of jejune improvement or none at all. On the 
contrary, fulsome majorities contend that aH classes-65 percent for the 
working class, 56 percent for the middle class, and 72 percent for the upper 
class-have done better. When the comparison is set against the Fr.anco years, 
the perceived improvement comes out to be even higher. 
The sense of feeling better off is pervasive. It would be hard to imagine 
a more ample base of support for the socialist govemment, and for Spanish 
democracy, than the polltical credit built up out of economic performance.8 
Yet it would be naive to conclude that the figures speak for thernselves. 
Several questions can be raised. First, is it in fact the case that economie 
considerations count for more than symbolic issues in influencing support 
for the govemment and satisfaction with democracy? Second, what 
'economic considerations' are at work? Pocketbook experience? Preferences 
on economic poliey? Perceptions oí economic conditions in the aggregate 
(Lewis-Beck, 1987)? 
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The answer to the first question is yes: by and large, perceptions oí 
'. ecoÍlomic períormance determine 'orientations toward ·the government more 
strongly than do positions on questions oí principie or preíerences on 
symbolic-e.g., religious-controversies. The latter issues are not wholly 
irrelevant, but as determinants oí government support and opposition they 
pale in comparison with calculations surrounding the economy 
(McDonough, Barnes and L6pez Pina, 1986a). 
. The answer to the second set oí questions is more complex. Spaniards, 
rather like Americans, make judgments about the government more on the 
e basis oí their understanding oí how well or badly the economy as a whole is 
doing than with reíerence to their immediate personal experience (their 
'pocketbooks'). Indeed. this may be less surprising in Spain than in the 
United States, where a legacy oí rugged individualism is supposed tO'be 
powerful. In Spain, the statist tradition remains strong and citizens are 
probably more accustomed to viewing the economic system as a collective 
organism for whose health the government has major responsibility. 
What may be equally symptomatic oí the de-ideologization oí Spanish 
politics is the tendency íor Spaniards to evaluate government more on the 
basis oí economic performance than by reason of their pro or con positions on 
issues of economic poli<;y. While the economic arena is not consensual, there 
is broad agreement on the boundaries oí policy. The PSOE government, by 
pre-empting many oí the programs oí the center-right, has muddled 
ideological divisions as effectively as did the Opus Dei technocrats of the 
Franco regime when they jettisoned neomercantilist models oí autarchic 
development. Decades oí economic ingenuity and opportunism have drained 
the categories oí economic progressivism and conservatism oí much oí their 
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meaning. Retrospective evaluations of performance over-ride 
characteristically left-versus-right slants on economic issues (Fiorina, 1981). 
When all these tendencies are considered together, it may seem that 
political culture has been excised from Spanish polities. Undeniably Spain is 
taking on the contours and accoutrements of a Brand-X industrial society. The 
González governrnent has repeatedly mocked the pretensions of florid 
pensadores and political blowhards. The fact that economic factors count for 
more than symbolic considerations, and that on the whole ideology, whether 
economic or religious, counts for less than material performance provides 
evidence for the debility of political culture as obscurantism and religious 
atavismo 
It does not, however, confirm the elirnination of distinctive political 
traditions tout court. The interchange between culture and 'rationality' is not 
a seesaw or a zero-surn garne. Consider the data in Table 8. In their study of 
class awareness in the United States, the Jackmans (1983) inquired about the 
acceptability of income differences. A breakdown of responses from the 
original study, arrayed by the social class of respondents, is given at the top of 
Table 8. The two subtables arrayed below give the results of our replication for 
the 1984 and 1990 surveys in Spain. 
In two respects the crossnational results are similar. The modal 
category in both countries is centrist: 'sorne differences in income.' In 
addition, within each country, the connection between class and preference 
follows an expected pattem. Lower class respondents, both Spanish and 
American, express relatively egalitarian views. F or all this, the countries 
diverge markedly. 'Large differences' are more acceptable in the United 
States; 'practically no differences' are more legitimate in Spain. The variation 
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between countries with respect to appropriate incorne differences is greater 
than the variation between cJasses'within countries. 
T ABLE 8. DESIRED INCOME DIFFERENCES By SOOAL CLASS, 
U;-·;JTED STATES (1975) AND SPAlN (1984 A1\'D 1990) 
U.S.A.1975 
working rniddle upper 
great difference 26% 32% 49% 
sorne difference 56 58 42 
practically no difference 12 8 7 
don't know / no response 6 2 1 
SPAlN 1984 
, 
.' ._-_ ... _ .... -----_ .. _-------~'------------- .. -... _ .... _ .. _-------
working rniddle upper 
great difference 3% 4% 7% 
sorne difference 65 69 68 
practically no difference 31 26 24 
don't know /no response 2 1 1 
SPAlN 1990 
working rniddle upper 
great difference 7% 11% 17% 
sorne difference 60 63 64 
practically no difference' 29 23 17 
don't know/no response 4 3 2 
~ 
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A distributive, semi-populist discourse is still common in spain. This 
cultural inflection is understandable given the country's history of poverty 
and econornic disparity and in light of the centralist traclition of the state 
(Veliz, 1980). The populist orientation shows a suggestive, if less than 
massive, shift between 1984 and 1990. There has been a clear increase in the 
tolerance for 'large differences' in income, even though such differences do 
not approach the normative status they enjoy in the United states. 
For our purposes the lesson is that crossnationally comparable 
regularities are filtered through cultural contexts crystallized out of 
clistinctive histories. The cognitive maps by which spaniards as well as 
Americans chart the paths between economics and politics are 'rational' in 
the sense that considerations of econornic performance figure prominently in 
- evaluations of the government-more so, as a rule, than symbolic issues 
, (Lewis-Beck, 1987). At the same time, the realm of the econornic is itself 
enfolded within cultural norms. Just as the individualistic ethic tends to be 
hegemonic in the United Sta tes, the rhetoric of social egalitarianism and of 
governmental responsibility for econornic management is more than a 
residual convention oí spanish political culture.9 
SYMBOLIC POLmcs 
Two ways oí slicing the data have guided the forgoing analysis. We 
partitioned issues into economic and symbolic varieties. Within the 
econornic realm, a further division was made between evaluations oí 
material performance in the aggregate and perceptions of the condition of 
individual pocketbooks. Art analogous clistinction can be drawn in the non-
econornic domain: between symbolic issues that have public resonance and 
those with a narrower, nearly priva te scope. The clistinction bears on the 
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extensien of democratic forms and procedures to voluntary organizations and 
._primary groups clese to home. Conceivably, there may be no one-to-one 
relationship between preferences about and perceptions of policy on symbolic 
issues and notions about individual morality, for example. Public democracy 
may coexist with private hierarchy. 
T able 9 suggests that Spaniards nurture different orientations toward 
the public domain, understood as degrees of satisfaction with the government 
and with democracy, and satisfaction with quality-of-life areas such as work 
and family. On the average, feelings about family life are more positive than 
those toward work and politics. lO 
Striking though they may be, however, these differences by themselves 
are inconc1usive. Spaniards who feel good about their farnily life might also 
be positively disposed toward the public realm, and vice-versa, even as they 
keep the two at different levels. In this case, at least in relative terms, "the 
personal' and 'the political' would tend to go together. 
TABLE 9. 
MEAN SATISFACTION (1=LOW ••• 10=HIGH) 
ACROSS FOUR DOMAINS, 
1990 
Family 8.2 
Work 6.9 
Democracy 5.6 
Government 5.5 
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But as it happens, the domains are (with sorne telltale exceptions to be 
noted momentarily) distinct in both the absolute and relative sense. Not only 
do attitudes toward abortion, for example, have practically no effect on 
support for or opposition to the gm,'ernment-something that we would 
expect from the dominance of economic over symbolic issues in shaping 
political assessments. It is also the case that preferences regarding abortion 
have little connection with farnily satisfaction and other, presumably private 
questions. The issue shows few upward or downward linkages. In outline, the 
pattern of dissociation between symbolic and personal matters parallels the 
difíerentiation Spaniards make between perceptions of economic conditions 
writ large and their own economic fortunes. 
This is, however, just an outline. Filling it in requires us to recognize 
several nUances. In the first place, attitudes on moral and symbolic issues--
on the legalization of abortion, on gay rights, and the like-are associated 
.with left-right placement, more closely in fact than are preferences on 
, 
questions of economic policy. Yet this whole bundle of ideological 
orientations is itself only very feebly linked with judgments of the 
government or economic performance. Hence, the political consequences of 
such issues tend to be marginal. Positions on moral issues weigh more 
heavily than preferences on econornic policy as organizing elements oí leít-
right leanings. But ideology oí this sort is something of a cultural specter, 
compared to evaluations of economic conditions, in influencing stands 
toward the government and indeed toward the political system. 
Second, on the whole, attitudes regarding moral policy stand apart 
from the satisfaction or dissatisfaction that individual Spaniards find in their 
farnily lives. To be sure, the labor market situation of individuals affects their 
preíerences on such issues. For example, working women are more likely 
---- -------------
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than women who stay at home to favor legalized abortion. But neither these 
. -.conditions nor these attitudes are related to degrees of support for the 
government. 
Third, positions on one crucial issue contradict in part the dissociation 
between public and private realms. Agree-disagree responses to the statement 
that "the best thing for a woman is to keep busy at home" show a modest but 
significant relation not only with reports of family satisfaction but also with 
opposition to the government. While not overwhelming, both associations 
persist in the midst of gene rally stronger factors involved in family and 
political satisfaction.ll 
At first glance, the pattern seerns surprising. The abortion issue appears 
dearly to be the hotter issue. It shows greater ideological polarization than 
women's-rights-in-general. Yet··it is the women-at-home/women-at-work 
5plit that affects both governmental popularity and family satisfaction, while 
the abortion controversy does noto 
What is most probably at stake in this "generic" women's issue is the 
passing of a powerful emblem of a way of life. Women's labor force 
participation is stilllow but increasing in Spain, compared to rates in other 
, industrial countries. The family as a shrine of female domesticity 
reverberates, more than the question oí abortion, with the traditions of the 
old Spain in the íace of accelerating modernization. It is the inherited role of 
women, and of the family as a sanctuary for a threatened way of life, that 
constitutes one of the most powerful of symbolic issues in Spain. It bridges 
public and private realms. 
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THE PuZZLE OF AsSOOATIONAL LIFE 
We have documented one trend that by most theoretical accounts 
favors democratization and another that may be less benign for the 
institutionalization of democracy. Ideological polarization between the left 
and right seems to be fading in Spain. Yet participation in voluntary 
associations-the foundational units of democratic cornity-appears to be in 
stasis if not decline. 
Only scraps of data are available to set the Spanish condition in 
crossnational context and thereby to assess the supposed 'lowness' of 
associationallife in Spain by empirical standards (Di Palma, 1970). 
Nevertheless, sorne pieces of internal information can be mustered to make 
out the contours of organizational involvement. This information comes in 
two íorms. Oneconsistsof the reports of membership in voluntary 
organizations mentioned at the outset of the analysis. The other is made up 
oí responses to a question about how close to or distant from their neighbors 
! 
Spaniards feeI.12 
These associational indicators are themselves unrelated; organizational 
membership and neighborhood ties vary independently of one another. 
, 
, Neighborhood linkages and membership in voluntary associations need not, 
. 
oí course, be mutually exclusive, but neither does one seem to build upon 
another. 
The second pattern is that local links and associational membership go 
in opposite directions when broken down by the usual suspects-by age, 
education, social class, and the like. The pertinent trends are given in Table 
10. 
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Men 
Women 
Men 
Women 
l' 
, 
Men 
Women 
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TABLF10. NEIGJIB.oRHOOO TIES ANO 
MEMBERSHIP 11\" VOLL ",ARY ASSOCIATIONS 
By AGE, EOUCATION, CLASS & LOCALE OF RESIDENCE, 
CONTROLU~G FOR GENDER, 
1<:>90 
Percent Reporting 'Very Oose Relations" with Neighbors 
byAge 
16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ 
10 13 12 16 26 26 28 
13 12 13 20 30 31 34 
Percent Belonging to One or More Voluntary Associations 
by _-\ge 
16-19 
39 
22 
20-29 
39 
30 
30-39 
48 
33 
40-49 
51 
28 
50-59 
36 
24 
60-69 
34 
16 
70+ 
19 
15 
Percent Reporting 'Very Oose Relations' with Neighbors 
by Education 
Incomplete Complete 
None Primar:}' Primar:}' Secondar:}' Higher 
21 . 28 24 11 13 
28 30 22 16 9 
Percent Belonging to One or More Voluntary Associations 
by Education 
Incomplete Complete 
None Primar:}' Primar:}' Secondar:}' Higher 
Men 17 26 35 46 57 
Women 13 14 25 35 39 
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Table 10. (continued) 
Percent Reporting 'Very Close Relations' with Neighbors 
by Class Identification 
Men 
Women 
Working Middle 
c1ass c1ass 
22 
23 
17 
23 
Upper-middle 
c1ass 
11 
15 
Percent Belonging to One or More Voluntary Associations 
by Class Identification 
Men 
Women 
W orking Middle 
c1ass c1ass 
32 
20 
43 
28 
Upper-middle 
c1ass 
53 
34 
Percent Reporting "Very Close Relations' with Neighbors & 
Percent Belonging to One or More Voluntary Associations 
by Population of Locale of Residence 
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200- to to to to to to more than 
2.000 5.000 10.000 30.000 50.000 200.000 1.000.000 1.000.000 
%close 31 25 24 22 19 21 14 16 
%members 19 28 28 28 42 32 34 35 
As might be expected, Spaniards living in small towns are likely to feel 
closer to their neighbors than those living in large dties. The same goes for 
women, who stay at home more often than meno Somewhat more striking is 
the decline of 'neighborliness' with risings levels of education, for both men 
and women. 
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It is the juxtaposition oí the seemingly commonplace regularities 
'. associated with neighborliness and·the mirror-image tendencies associated 
with membership in voluntary organizations that produces the most 
revealing configurations. Working-class Spaniards are likelier to íeel close to 
their neighbors than do their upper-middle class peers. At the same time, 
Spaniards toward the upper reaches of the social hierarchy are likelier to 
belong to voluntary associations. Put simplistically: lower-class Spaniards 
have friends and neighbors; upper- and middle-class Spaniards have 
colleagues and associates. The reciprocal pattem buttresses the plausibility of 
'the strength of weak ties· syndrome (Granovetter, 1976): the tendency for 
secondary networks to expand independently, if not at the expense, of 
primary ties,13 
Significant variations also emerge on this offsetting pattem. 
Neighborhood linkages build up over time. What portion of this increase is 
traceable to the life-cycle and what portion may be attributable to more 
permanent generational differences is problematic, although the greater 
mobility of younger cohorts lends weight to an interpretation stressing 
genuine historical change. However this may be, it is clear that membership 
in voluntary organizations follows a curvilinear pattem with age, rising 
toward the middle years (40-49 is the peak for men, 30-39 for women), then 
declining. While sorne of this may reflect a falling-off in social activity with 
advanced age, a good deal of it must be due to the fact that Spaniards over 50 
had few opportunities in their early years, dominated as they were by 
Francoism, for participation in civil society. 
Can any of this help explain the apparent stagnation in associational 
activity in Spain? Two complementary patterns are suggestive. First, while 
participation in voluntary associations tends to rise from small towns to 
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larger cities, it does so only up to a point (in cities between 50,000 and 200,000), 
dropping off (though not to small-town levels) thereafter. Progressive 
'urbanization' does not feed linearly into a denser 'civil society'; 
'modemization' does not simply go up and up. 
Second, while the decline of neighborliness is inversely linear with 
age, with older Spaniards tending to be more tightly integrated in their local 
. communities, the advance of membership in voluntary associations is 
curvilinear with age. In effect, neighborliness is receding more rapidly than 
associational membership is advaneing. This may account in part for the 
seant and uncertain progress observed in organizational activity since the 
.. onset of democratization to the present time in Spain. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The reconstruction of past mentalités is so flawed an enterprise that we 
will never know for sure what portion of the de-ideologization of Spanish 
politics represents 'objective' change and what portion reflects the 
demystification of stereotypes associated with the black legend of Hispanic 
zealotry. The softening of the antagonisms between left and right has 
occurred amid unprecedented prosperity and a massive transformation of the 
class structure of the country; it also reflects a lesson about the hazards of 
conflict without quarter and the benefits of compromise, learned at great cost. 
The depiction of Spanish politics as inveterately polarized at least 
provided an interpretive template with a modicum of verisimilitude. The 
passing of this dualistic imagery may increase the appeal of another, not 
altogether implausible but still insufficient stereotype, one that associates the 
unaccustomed pragmatism of political life with anomie in civil society 
(Aranguren, 1991). The puzzle is non-trivial. Spaniards are more concerned 
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about crime in the streets than with disputes between the political left and 
". right, and associational density does appear to below in"Spain,14 Yet the polity 
shows no signs oí coming aparto What holds the system together, then, aside 
írom good economic times? EvidenUy, a strong reading oí political culture-
an insistence on norms as societal glue-stands in need of correction. 
Several circumstantial and theoretical íactors can be brought into play. 
Consider fust the timing oí democratization in Spain. The institutional 
environment and organizational equipment surrounding the emancipation 
oí Spanish politics írom Francoism were not the same as that associated with 
waves oí democratization in the late eighteenth, the nineteenth and the first 
half oí the twentieth century. As severa! observers have pointed out, Spain 
entered on redemocratization at a time when the technology of mass 
politics-specifically, themass media-had become widespread and powerful 
(Pérez Díaz, 1991). In coming to estimates oí participation in voluntary 
organizations, our analysis has implicitly highlighted the significance oí 
altemative modes oí orchestrating public opinion and interests (Lawson and 
Merkl, 1988) and has layed the groundwork for subsequent investigation oí 
the role of the mass media. It reinforces the possibility that the standard 
institutional vehic1es oí representative democracy-political parties, labor 
unions, and the like-no longer have the íunctional monopoly over mass 
politics they might once have hado 
Second, depolarization entails a certain privatization-that is, a 
distancing from the holistic, integrative, quasi-redemptive visions íavored by 
the maximalists and terrible simplifiers of Spanish politics. At the popular 
level it is doubtful (as the dialectic between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza 
intimates) whether a political temper of this extremist, salvific sort ever held 
sway. What we may be witnessing is the confluence of two forces, one 
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modem and one traditional. On the one hand, the electronic media may 
operate for sorne Spaniards as mechanisms of vicarious participation or 
spectatorship. On the other, privatism as a version of 'amoral íamilism" has 
long been a staple oí Spanish society (Gilmore, 1987). At sorne point it must 
become an empirical question whether the íormer development is prejudicial 
to democratic consolidation, and whether the latter tradition is in íact a 
subversive atavismo 
Third, the dec1awing of the stock antinomies oí Spanish politics has 
resulted not only írom prosperity and írom the lessons oí the past but also 
from the increasing permeability of Spanish culture to intemational values 
conveyed by the media. The under-organized society oí the last years oí the 
Franco regime was not shielded írom television and tourism. However, at 
the same time that Spain seerns to be undergoing an intemationalization oí 
popular culture, it may also be experiencing a localization oí political 
organization and participation. Except for voting, very íew citizens 'act' 
nationally in any political system. The devolution oí political power toward 
the autonomias and municipal governments oí Spain has almost certainly 
íacilitated local associationalism. This raises the question oí how micro-
networks connect up with movements and organizations oí larger scope. 
The relatively uncharted landscape oí local involvement in Spain also 
conveys a lesson regarding the study oí the culture oí mass politics. Political 
science is still afflicted by measures of 'trust' and 'system support' which, 
like c1assic tracts, everyone cites and no one reads. Such indicators are known 
to be stratospheric, the Platonic vapors oí theory as highmindedness, and 
efforts at assessing 'legitimacy,' for example, tend to tum into a game oí 
correlating attitudes with attitudes. Mapping the morphology and flux oí 
associational networks is apt to yield a steadier purchase on political culture-
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one that more c10sely approximates a systematic anthropology of behavior 
. and the meanings attached to it-· across'the multiple domains in which 
people actually live, 
Finally, the clifferentiation we have documented between public and 
private spheres is not peculiarly Spanish (Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 
1976), and it might be taken as a sign of the maturation of Spanish mass 
politics. In the midst of the uncertainties that democracy is supposed to 
institutionalize, citizens may seek out havens of predictability and hierarchy. 
Democracy writ large becomes a routine and remote convenience, favoring 
tolerance and procedural guarantees. This compartmentalization may help 
account for the less-than-overwhelming enthusiasm for workplace 
democracy, the mixed feelings about flattened-out farnily structures, and the 
hard-to-detect connections between these domains and politics with a capital 
"P." 
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NOTES 
lThe primary source lor our analysis consists of four surveys conducted in 1978, 1980, 1984 
and 1990; the number of respondents in each was approximately 3,000. 
Crhe theories form something of a historical sequence. The emphasis on parties 
emerged out of the ambience of classical pluralismo The neocorporatist view is c10sely 
identUied with the emergence of advanced industrial societies in Westem Europe, operating in 
a Keynesian mode during the sixties and early seventies (Berger, 1981; Meier, 1987). The view 
that accentuates the media has a postmodemist ringo 
3Por the left-right scale, 1 = left .... 10 = right. Por the satisfaction scales, 1 = 
dissatisfied ... 10 = satisfied. 
4Note to arnbiguity of religion; Pérez Días (1991a). 
5-r'he apparent increase in fond memories of the Pranco regime is spurious. As we move 
forward in time, fewer and fewer Spatúards have any recollections of the fascist regime, and 
those who do tend increasingly to consist of a shrinking group of older, conservative Spaniards. 
<iNote lo correlation between Gorbachev and )pIl. 
7Compare Rem mer (1990). 
asee however Campos and Alvarez (1990). 
~ote to sarne pattem from E. Europe ¡Soviet surveys. 
lÜNote lo question-wording. 
llNote lo evidence (correlations). 
12Note to question-wording. 
13Note lo effect of geographic mobility. 
14In 1990 we asked repondents how important they felt five different problerns were. 
The conflict "between citizens who repect the laws and crinúnals" carne out on top (55 percent 
said il was very importanl). In second place carne Ihe conflict "between who have money and 
those don't" (37 percenl very important); in third place Ihe conflict belween "the nationalists 
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[Basques, Catalans, Gallegos) and the rest of Spani ards , (22 percent very important); in fourth 
place the conflict 'between those of the left and those who consider themselves on the right' 
(13 percent); and in fifth place the conflict 'between those who follow the morals and the 
teaching of the church and those who don't' (12 percent). 
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